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Brandom and the Second Person

Abstract
Brandom is one of the main advocators of the idea that meaning is instituted
within basic linguistic practices through mutual exchanges. The aim of this paper is to
show that such framework cannot do the required job if the dynamics of mutual
exchanges is understood in interpretational terms. After arguing that the interpretational
framework does not work,

the paper presents an alternative second-personal

conversational model capable of meeting the challenge.
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Brandom and the Second Person

Against a communitarian-consensual perspective that reduces meaning to what
the relevant community as a whole thinks is correct, Brandom, following Davidson1,
has complained that in order to develop such an elucidation of linguistic practices, the
relation between language users and meaning must be approached starting with the
point of view of an interpreter, that is, that it is not only necessary to take into account
the relation between human practices and semantic interpretants but also that we cannot
make sense of this idea without acknowledging the perspectival character of meaningattribution within those practices. This is what Brandom calls the I-Thou relation,
claimed to be more fundamental than the I-We relationship that constitutes the
communitarian-consensual construal of social linguistic practices2. It is only through the
eyes of the interpreter that we can make sense of language as a game or practice in
which human beings are engaged. The I-We relation can only be understood as deriving
from the I-Thou one and characteristic of the latter is that it is an interpretative stance
that can be thought of as equivalent to an external, observational standpoint:

“[…]this sort of external interpretive stance —what one must do, how one must
treat an alien community in order thereby to count as taking them to be making assertions
and inferences—is seen to be equivalent to an internal scorekeeping stance within a
discursive community. That is, one must adopt toward the practitioners […] the same
sort of attitude one both takes them to adopt towards each other and adopts towards one’s
1

Brandom 2010: 33-34, where he acknowledges this debt.
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See Brandom 1994: 37-42, especially p.39
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own discursive fellows. […] In short, the stance in question is a translational-interpretive
stance that evidently belongs in a box with the orthodox Davidsonian variety”3

In this manner, Brandom rejects the idea that there is a distinction between being
in conversation (an internal scorekeeping stance within a discursive community) and an
external interpretational stance (the one someone undertakes when observing a
conversation from a distance). Nevertheless, I will argue that collapsing both
dimensions commits this theory to ignore the relevance of a different understanding of
second personal interaction, one that may seem to be essential for making sense of the
possibility of linguistic practices altogether.
Different authors have underlined the need of a second-personal dimension in
Brandom’s account of normative linguistic practices4. Habermas (2000) has claimed
against Brandom’s picture that if we think of the interpreter stance in a third-personal
way, we lose the idea of a language as being a way in which individuals engage in the
pursuit of common goals and values. Brandom responds that according to a thirdpersonal point of view of meaning attribution like his, one can actually engage in social
linguistic practices without pursuing common goals or sharing values5. According to
Brandom, a second-personal kind of interaction among language users is needed only to
make sense of common goals shared by them, but not to make sense of the possibility of
there being linguistic practices altogether.
On the other hand, Kukla & Lance (2009) and Wanderer (2010) have argued that
being addressed is an essential dimension of speech acts in the game of giving and
asking for reasons. According to Kukla & Lance (2009: 163) this addressive, second3

Brandom 2010: 33-4. See also Brandom 1994: 659, n.50.
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Habermas 2000; Kukla & Lance 2009 and Wanderer 2010.
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Brandom 2000a: 362, acknowledges Habermas’ account of his theory as a ‘fair characterization’.
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personal character of speech acts - mostly clear in imperatives, invitations, promises and
so forth - is characteristic to every speech act, even if implicitly, and necessary for them
in order to perform their normative function. In Wanderer’s opinion, this is an essential
feature of certain speech acts – challenges in Brandom’s terms - and absolutely essential
for those to be such. They all agree in that the addressive second personal aspect can be
thought to be implicit in Brandom’s theory and that the person targeted will be failing to
give an appropriate response only if ignores the address, and will be acknowledging it
no matter how she responds to it (compliance, refusal, or anything in between)6. But this
line of argument does not put into question the essentially interpretational observational
picture that is the basis of the dynamics of scorekeeping practice, but rather
complements it. Contrary to this framework, I will claim that an understanding of the
practice of giving and asking for reasons as a second-personal interaction is in tension
with the interpretational understanding of it that Brandom subscribes to. If that picture
is not abandoned, normative practices cannot be described as second-personal in a fullblooded sense. While thinking of exchanges among participants in the practice in this
way is essential for Brandom’s model to work, as I will claim, a second person
understanding of the practice of giving and asking for reasons is both necessary for his
framework to work and at the same time in tension with the essential interpretational
stance that Brandom undertakes in Making it Explicit (MIE)7.
My aim in this paper is to present an argument, distinct from all of the above,
that purports to show that a framework that understands the institution of meaning
6

Kukla & Lance 2009: 162.
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Throughout this paper I will be focusing on Brandom’s MIE, which still counts as his systematic

account of the minimal sufficient conditions for a practice to be linguistic. Since MIE, Brandom has
worked intensively on Hegel’s notion of recognition, a notion that also plays an important role in this
paper. The question remains as to whether his later work could be said to be compatible with it. If so, the
issues raised in this paper still apply to his later work.
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through an essential interpersonal practical dynamics of exchanges, in order to account
for meaning and the normative import of content in the individual’s practice, cannot be
understood as an interpretational observational scorekeeping stance. Accordingly, I will
argue here that contrary to Brandom’s response to Habermas, a second-personal kind of
interaction is absolutely necessary to give an account of linguistic practices in terms of
the interaction of linguistic users. But it is necessary for very different reasons to those
invoked by Habermas, Lance & Kukla and Wanderer. I will claim that interpersonal
exchanges must be rather modeled in terms of a second-personal recognitional
dynamics. This means that some essential and basic features of the minimal conditions
for a practice to be deploying propositional content need to be rethought through a
different picture in which the core of the practice is the recognition of the others’
assessments towards one moves in the game, one that is only intelligible as a practice
within a linguistic community, and not, as in Brandom’s picture, incompatibilities and
scorekeeping of entitlements and commitments. Without the introduction of such a way
of understanding linguistic practices, normativity is lost and, with it, the possibility of
meaning altogether.
The contrast between a second-personal dynamics in my terms and a thirdpersonal one can be characterized by the way in which we take into account a different
person’s perspective. Only in the former case it is implied that the other person’s
perspective matters to their interlocutor. Becoming sensitive to norms, as will be shown
in this paper, implies acknowledging the other person’s assessment of our actions. This
acknowledgment must be understood as involving two dimensions: (1) acknowledging
the attributions the other person makes to me by taking myself to be committed and (2)
withdrawing previous commitments in the light of the challenge that this person
addresses to me. In order for the practice to be normative, it is required to be sensitive in
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just this way which, as will be argued, requires the interaction of the two perspectives to
have the form of a conversation, within a discursive community, where the criticisms
and differences between the two are acknowledged. This is the contrast between a third
person interpretative standpoint, in which the interpreter could remain completely
external to the perspective of the interpretee and does not need to ‘interact’ with her
except by interpreting, and the kind of practice that involves second person stances
among practitioners.
The structure of this article is as follows: in the first section I present the
conditions of adequacy on semantic normativity raised by Wittgenstein and Sellars and
the general strategy to meet them designed by Brandom. In the second section, I
criticize Brandom’s view by giving an example of interaction between two people using
Brandom’s account of interaction. I show that in a practice like that no norms are in
place and no meaning has been assigned to linguistic sounds and marks. Thirdly, I
present a positive account of interaction, a second-personal model, that incorporates a
set of distinctive elements that characterize conversations and allow us to meet the
conditions of adequacy presented in the first section. Finally, I make some concluding
remarks regarding the allegedly essential role of this second-personal sort of interaction
in basic linguistic practices (hereafter BLP).

1. Brandom’s Answer to the Wittgensteinian Conditions of Adequacy

We can think of a language as “a system of expressions the use of which is
subject to certain rules” (Sellars 1954: 204). Becoming a language user would then be
conceived as learning to obey the rules for the use of its expressions. Nevertheless, as
Sellars remarked, this would immediately imply a vicious regress, for the rules that
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formulate the correct use of the expressions are themselves expressed in a language, so
we would need to know a language in order to learn it; the postulation of an open-ended
sequence of meta-languages that have to be learned is then unavoidable8.
According to Sellars, the strategy for solving this problem is to distinguish
between the ability to formulate, to say, to state the rules that codify the correct use of
an expression and the ability to act conforming to norms. The idea is that this last ability
involves acting in the light of the demands that norms enjoin in actions, i.e. becoming
able to respect the norm, without presupposing “being aware” or “having before one’s
mind” the very content that one is acknowledging and respecting in acting that way, on
pain of restating the aforementioned regress.
Accordingly, regarding the possibility of giving an account of normativity, two
conditions of adequacy emerge. On the one hand, accounting for the possibility of
becoming a rule follower in the sense of being able to perform normative actions
implies that the subject becomes sensitive to the requirements of a norm in a stronger
sense that just acting according to a regularity, thus acting in the light of the demands of
the norms and not coinciding with them ‘by chance’. On the other, accounting for this
possibility requires rejecting the idea that what one does when following a rule is to
follow explicit contents that one has in mind.
To conceive this coming into language through the picture constituted solely by
an individual coping with her environment will prove equally wrong headed. As
Wittgenstein remarks in PI, 258: ‘One would like to say: whatever is going to seem
right to me is right. And that only means that here we can’t talk about “right”’. The
important point here is that a person cannot become a language user in isolation. The
problem seems to be that a basic trait of a language, and the main reason why we are
8

There is another alternative, i.e. to postulate a language of thought that is fundamentally different from
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talking about rules in the first place, is that using a language is something that can be
done correctly or incorrectly. We can make mistakes, and learn how to act in the future
from those mistakes. But, if the correctness in the use of expressions and the
acknowledgement of mistakes were completely left to the point of view of the
individual, then what is correct and what seems correct would coincide. And this would
mean that there would not be a distinction between right and wrong available to the
speaker, i.e. no space for the distinction between being right and wrong, and hence we
would lose the possibility of having meant anything at all. The act of meaning
something by the use of an expression would turn out to be completely illusory.
The conclusion that some readers of Wittgenstein draw from this argument is
that what is needed in order to fulfill the conditions of adequacy aforementioned implies
a shift from an individual to a social model of meaning (Cfr. PI 202). What this amounts
to is to think of meaning and normativity from the point of view of socially structured
linguistic practices.
This is precisely Brandom’s strategy to account for meaning. According to him,
to get out of the Wittgenstein-Sellars’ puzzle, semantic norms should be thought of as
instituted by those who acknowledge them in practice. Only the assessing attitudes
implicit in the practice of treating performances as correct or incorrect - not thought of
as propositionally contentful states, but as practical doings- can do the required job.
This would prevent the regress of interpretations, on the one hand, and avoid a
regularity account with no normative statuses in place, on the other. Accordingly, when
we think of normative linguistic practices, what these attitudes institute are linguistic
norms: semantically contentful norms.

learned languages. See Fodor 1975. I won’t discuss the prospects of this move here.
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Brandom describes what these attitudes or doings should be like in order to be
sufficient for the practice that involves them to be a normative linguistic practice. In the
third chapter of MIE, he points out that there are some doings that suffice for a practice
being a linguistic practice. Inferring and asserting are the basic doings that someone
engaged in a linguistic practice has to be able to perform, and they are constitutive of
what Brandom calls the game of giving and asking for reasons. An assertion is
something that is a reason and something for which we can demand reasons, and hence
assertions are inferentially articulated. The following points characterize Brandom’s
understanding of the game of giving and asking for reasons:
1.Assertions can exhibit two normative statuses: commitments and entitlements.
2.Making an assertion is in the first instance undertaking a commitment which in
turn involves further commitments given the inferential articulation among
commitments. Such are what Brandom calls commitive inferences.
3. Commitments are not only something that can be given as a reason but also
something reasons can be asked for. So, there are permissive inferences that
articulate entitlement preserving relations among assertions.
4.The relations between commitments and entitlements must be underwritten by
incompatibility relations. A participant in the game must recognise incompatiblity
relations among commitments which can be described in the following way: p is
incompatible with q if commitment to p precludes entitlement to q.
5.Relations among commitments are not only intrapersonally inferentially
articulated but also interpersonally articulated. Other practitioners of the game of
giving and asking for reasons can use an assertion just made and undertake it.
Thought of in this way, making an assertion is also putting it forward as a
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commitment that anyone can undertake hence attributing entitlement to it. This is
what may be called interpersonal inheritances of commitment.
6. Vindicating entitlement to one’s claims can be achieved either through
intrapersonal intercontent justifications or through interpersonal intracontent
inheritance of commitments and entitlements.
7.The role that assertions have in a linguistic practice depends on authority, and this
in turn is only intelligible against the background of the corresponding responsibility
to vindicate the entitlements to the commitments that the assertion represents.
Judging is committing oneself, taking responsibility.
8.The way to ask for justification is to challenge an assertion; that is done in the
basic case by making incompatible assertions. Characteristic of the game is a default
challenge structure: giving reasons is only mandatory when they are properly asked
for9. The authority gained in the first place by default and vindicated by fulfilling
the responsibility of justifying it is central to the game. It is also possible for the
practitioners to defer their justifying responsibility to another asserter.

To sum up, asserting is undertaking a commitment, making a claim for
entitlement; in doing so one becomes responsible, undertaking the responsibility to give
justification, when properly asked for. There are two different ways to show entitlement
to one’s claims: justifying by asserting, and deferring to another that is entitled to it10.
9

The reason is that taking the asserter to be prima facie entitled is just what is for an interpreter to take

her as a competent deployer of the concept, that is what one does when one undertakes a commitment that
has been asserted by another (i.e. interpersonal inheritance of commitment) Cf. Brandom 2010: 26.
10

There is in fact a third way to show entitlement, by invoking authority as a reliable non-inferential

reporter. There are also two sorts of inferences that we did not discuss: practical and empirical. I will not
discuss any of them here since they are not central to my argument.
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Thought of in this way the game itself depends on the structure of authority and
responsibility that links the individual’s doings in a social, intersubjective way, linking
the intracontent interpersonal and the intercontent intrapersonal dimensions of
justification. The cost of the failure to answer a challenge is the loss of authority in the
eyes of the scorekeeper and so, in his eyes, the loss of the authority to pass it on to
others. On the other hand, while the reassertion license is in place (not yet challenged or
satisfactorily responded to in the eyes of the scorekeeper) the entitlement can be
bequeathed to others who can defer justification to the original assertor. According to
Brandom (2010: 26-7), it is this authority and corresponding responsibility together
with the notion of challenge what gives its characteristic dynamics to the inferential
practice.
At the same time, making an assertion implies the acknowledgment on the part
of the asserter of the commitment he is overtly undertaking – even if this does not imply
that she acknowledges all the commitments that she is thereby undertaking. This
acknowledgement is thought of as a status that is (properly) attributed to someone when
she overtly asserts a claim and not as any kind of internal or (conscious) act of
recognition, this acknowledgement is thus thought of exclusively as an attribution on
the part of the interpreter, the scorekeeper. The crucial social aspect of the activity of
inferring lies in the way in which each participant of the practice keeps score of the
other’s entitlements and commitments. Being an interpreter is being a scorekeeper.
Given this framework, how can we account for the sensitivity to norms that the
interpreter himself must exhibit in his practices in order for these to be semantically
normative? The very same question is presented by Brandom by asking what one has to
be doing in order to be an interpreter, that is, a language user, the participant in a
normative linguistic practice. His answer is that in order to be a language user one has
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to be interpretable as such, as taking and attributing all those normative attitudes:
undertaking commitments, attributing entitlements, responding to challenges
intrapersonallly and interpersonally and taking others to be doing so.
Brandom, as noted above, argues that the perspectival character of meaning attributions
has to be thought of as an external, third-personal stance. This perspective is equivalent
to the one speakers adopt towards each other within a linguistic community. In the
following section I show this perspective to be insufficient to account for the
normativity of linguistic practices. Next, I describe what else is needed on the part of
the practitioners in order for them to be engaged in a normative linguistic practice; this
will show a contrast between the attitudes that practitioners must adopt towards each
other when engaged in linguistic exchanges within a linguistic community (what I will
call a second person perspective) and those involved in interpreting a community from
an external point of view, i.e. the third-personal interpretational stance.

2. A community of interpreters.

As described above, according to Brandom there are two ways to respond to a
challenge: either by justifying intrapersonally the claim challenged or by deferring the
responsibility to justify it to the original assertor. Moreover, if one fails to fulfill the
justificatory responsibility demanded by the challenge one loses the authority that was
originally claimed when issuing the assertion in the first place.
Nevertheless, an argument will be presented in this section for the idea that a
third kind of response to a challenge (essentially second-personal) is absolutely
fundamental in the model in question and that without it the practice would lack the
appropriate friction and could not be normative. This second-personal kind of response
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could be basically described as the withdrawal of the original claim: though it needs not
be an explicit disavowal, it needs to be a change in the assertor’s box and one that is
sufficiently known by the challenger. In the context of MIE, Brandom refers to a
response of such a kind and mentions that it would be useful to have in the basic
linguistic practice special speech acts for queries, disavowals and challenges, but claims
that such a response does not need to be in place in every possible linguistic practice11.
I will not argue for the idea of any special speech act of disavowal. What I will show is
that, even if it does not always involve an explicit speech act of disavowal, this third
kind of response - essentially thought of as a change in the original assertor’s box12 – is
absolutely fundamental to make the model at stake work and, moreover, that its
inclusion implies shifting from a third-personal understanding of the role of the
interpreter to a second-personal one.
The strategy of my argument will be to present a practice with no secondpersonal recognition of incompatible claims by withdrawing claims previously held.
This will show that this practice is not normative for the individuals involved and that
their claims cannot be thought as contentful.

There are these three possible kinds of responses to a challenge13:
11

Brandom 1994: 192-3.

12

Brandom uses the term “box” to refer to the set of commitments, entitlements and incompatibility

relations that a speaker attributes to herself and to others.
13

At this point it is worth noting a crucial difference between Wanderer 2010 argument and mine. He

argues in favor of the idea that the recognition of challenges must be implicit in MIE. The claim is that
challenges need to be register per se, independently of the responses - 1, 2, or 3 above- that the assertor
gives. For him this means that these acts are addressed and that they are recognized as addressed. As it
will be clear from the argument to follow, this move is insufficient for responding to my challenge. My
argument is that challenges need to be recognized as such by being fundamentally undertaken as
authoritative by the assertor in the act of changing her commitments, and that if this were not the central
way in which we respond to challenges, the practice would dissolved.
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1.

By deferring the justification to someone else.

2.

By an intercontent intrapersonal justification.

3.

By acknowledging the incompatibility in our own box and thus withdrawing the

commitment (second personal interaction).14
We will suppose for the sake of the argument, that
(a) the practice does not involve (3) – since BLP are possible without (3).
(b) the practitioners do not share any commitments.
(c) the practitioners do not have any incompatible claims in their own boxes.
Both (b) and (c) will be drop later in the argument.
Given three players P1, P2 and P3: P1 says p (asserts, gets committed and asks
for entitlement, claims for authority, and assumes responsibility). P2 makes a claim
incompatible in his view with p: q. P1 may then act in the first (1) or the second (2)
ways mentioned above. Let us suppose she does (2), an intercontent intrapersonal
justification. She offers r, which is, in her box, a commitment which entitlementpreserves p. Now, P2 would not recognize it as entitlement-preserving in his own box
since r does not entitlement-preserves p in the light of q since q is incompatible with p
according to P2’s own box. This is to be expected as different participants in the
practice attach different contents to the utterances they use to specify each other’s
commitments. What is shared is the scorekeeping practice but not the contents of the
claims exchanged. Might the sharing of the practice suffice for P2 to recognize r as
entitlement-preserving of p even if P2 attaches a different content to r? That is, might
P2 recognize the pragmatic move that P1 is making, thus that P1 takes p to be justified
in the light of r? Indeed. P2 will attribute to P1 a commitment to r and a commitment to
an entitlement preserving inference from r to p, but P2 needs not and would not take this
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to be a good answer to his challenge since he is committed to q, and r does not
entitlement-preserve p in the light of q. So in the eyes of P2, P1 loses authority as an
assertor even if he acknowledges the move that P1 is making from a pragmatic point of
view.
Might P1 reply to P2’s challenge in any other way? P1 cannot offer r as a claim
incompatible with q since in that case ex hypothesi the commitments of P2 would not
include r or any other incompatible commitments to q. By hypothesis, P1 cannot show
P2 that he must recognize r as a justification for p through an incompatibility, as it must
be in order for r to be a justification for p in the light of q, since in order to do that r has
to be incompatible with q and hence, by hypothesis, would not be in P2’s box. Thus, P2
has no reasons to recognize p as justified (since she would not have in her own box nor
r nor any claim from which r would follow). Hence, P1 can only effectively respond to
P2 by (1), a deferral to P3.
But exactly the same situation would take place between P3 and P2.
Having exhausted the possible responses P1 could provide, P1 seems to be
unable to properly respond to the challenge by showing to P2 what her reasons are or by
agreeing with P2 that she is not entitled to p. The problem seems to be that in this
practice the reasons of each practitioner do not count as reasons for the others unless
they counted as already justified commitments in the box of each one of them. The only
way in which the practitioners could get others to recognize what they take themselves
to be entitled to (i.e. the only way in which they could come to share commitments)
would be by previously having the same claims in their boxes. It is only by removing
from the setting the assumption that they do not hold incompatible claims in their own
boxes (c above) that they can come to share a view about what they are entitled to. If
14

This is the second dimension of second personal interaction; cfr. (2), p. 5 above. I will refer to the first
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that were the case, P1 may find for example that she was already committed to q by
holding s and that s is incompatible with p, the claim she asserted. In this case she
would agree with P2, the challenger, and withdraw p, but this would occur absolutely
independently of the interlocutor and her justifications. So this is not a way in which
P2’s commitments could count as challenges for P1 since it is simply a case in which P1
was previously holding incompatible claims. What is lost in a scenario like this one is
the possibility of interlocutors addressing incompatible claims to each other in a way in
which they can get their interlocutor to recognize their challenges when there was not
previous reason for the interlocutor to change their commitments.
According to Brandom’s model, what this situation amounts to is that in the eyes
of each scorekeeper the others will lose authority. The only remaining authority would
then be the one that each individual scorekeeper has on herself. Thus, even if this may
come as a surprise in a model such as Brandom’s where the social structure of the
practice is essential, such a practice without second-personal interaction (i.e. responses
3 above), would be individual and not social. Each person’s reasons would not be
inherited intersubjectively, on the contrary, each participant would only have individual
sources of justification and she would only attribute entitlement to those assertions of
others that were in her eyes indistinguishable from her own. Furthermore, if the
practitioners only had individual sources of justification it would be always possible for
them not to recognize incompatible claims addressed to them by others as criticisms
since they would not recognize any normative-status-modifying sanctions by others
unless they had already thought that they were wrong. This means that they would be
reluctant to accept any challenge raised by others, not willing to change or revise their
commitments in the light of other practitioners’ reasons.

one in the next section.
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So, in this individual practice each of the practitioners would lose their grip on
any criteria of correction (any notion of being wrong), they would simply refuse to
recognize any authority but their own. To put it in a Wittgensteinian way, in such cases,
whatever seemed correct to them would be correct; and hence what they were doing
would not be subject to any norms. This is Wittgenstein’s argument against the
possibility of a private language, one that Brandom accepts when he claims that a
practice to be normative has to be social.15 In fact, they would lose the possibility of
recognizing incompatibilities altogether, losing sensitivity to any cognitive friction and
with it the possibility of having meant anything at all.
One may think that this line of reasoning can be contested by stressing the role
of agreement in the practice, something that plays a key role in Davidson’s account of
normative linguistic practices16. This will amount to removing condition (b) above, i.e.
that the practitioners do not share any commitments. This would give substance to the
idea that the interlocutors need to come to realize incompatibilities against a background
of shared commitments, one that already makes sense of the implicit incompatibilities in
their own boxes that the other participants could be pointing to when raising a challenge
(as it is apparent, this will also amount to dropping condition (c) above). It is true that
Brandom, as opposed to Davidson17, does not include a condition of ‘agreement in
background beliefs’ among the minimal conditions to make sense of BLP (see MIE, ch.
3). This is important as he takes the dynamics of scorekeeping and the exchange of
incompatibilities to be the basis of BLP, being what possibilitates agreement.
Nevertheless, as Brandom describes his view as “belonging in a box with the orthodox
Davidsonian variety”, one might think that this sort of agreement is somewhat implicit
15

This is pervasive in Brandom’s work, see e.g. Brandom 1994: 52-5.

16

I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this point.
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Davidson’s account itself is not immune to a similar line of criticism; see my Satne 2014.

18
in the framework. But this will not make any difference to the argument here for the
content of the claims in each participant’s boxes are still subject to the individual’s
interpretation. Since the framework does not require of the interlocutors to share the
interpretation of every claim they exchange, even if there are some utterances they do
share (say they both have s, j, and t in their own boxes18), the differences in how they
interpret the relations of those to q, r and p, will influence the content of the ones in the
exchange (and those they “agree upon”) leading them to have different interpretations of
the content of the claims at issue. Because of this, the claims they agree upon would not
make any difference as to the dynamics of posing challenges and responding to them,
thus leaving the situation exactly as it was portrayed at the beginning.
A different possible response to this argument is to be found in Brandom and
Wanderer. According to them19, the relevant traits of this sort of second-personal
interaction might be thought to be already implicit in the interpretationist framework of
MIE. The argument will run as follows: since the interpreter needs to be able to
distinguish between content and attitude for her own commitments, something that is
then explicitated by the de dicto and de re locutions when those are in place20, then a
practical and implicit way of treating claims as objective conceptual contents is at play
18

As the game is characterized by a default challenge structure an important number of utterances will be

shared by the interlocutors, even if they might be interpreting them differently.
19

They argue in favor of this idea when they describe the second-personal dynamics of exchange as being

possibly implicit in MIE framework. See Wanderer 2010 and Brandom 2010: 315. Brandom seems to
recognize that it is not implicit when he says, in response to Wanderer, that the inclusion of a secondpersonal aspect to every assertion “seems (to him) as a promising variant and development of the MIE
apparatus” (ibid.)
20

See Brandom 1994, chapter 8 and Brandom 2000b, chapter 6. It is important to note that this is what

Brandom understands as meeting the objectivity condition on meaning, i.e. that what is correct is different
from what one –anyone- takes to be correct. Brandom thinks he shows that his theory meets this condition
when the interpretational structure of attributing and acknowledging commitments is explicitated in
attitude locutions. If my argument is right, Brandom cannot meet this condition, see below.
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in MIE. The very ability of attributing commitments but not acknowledging them in
practice will be the way in which the model accounts for the individual being sensitive
to the normativity of contents. This can also be thought as the individual taking an
interpretative stance towards himself, where two time slices of the same individual will
fulfill the roles of the challenger and the addressee of the challenge, one attributing but
not acknowledging the commitment21. In this case it seems, prima facie, that since the
two perspectives are different time-slices of the same individual, they necessarily matter
for the one keeping score (namely, the present time-slice). This would seem to make
room for what my argument required, namely, for other’s perspective to matter for the
individual’s scorekeeping.
But this strategy just defers the problem without solving it. The point is for a
subject to be capable of distinguishing between being-correct to say p and beingcommitted to p. Describing an individual as being capable of that presupposes her being
able to distinguish them as two different perspectives on the same thing. The mere fact
that it is the same individual as psycho-biological unit does not provide for this relation
between the two perspectives since change may occur without acknowledging that the
content is the same. Someone who were not sensitive to cognitive friction could not
even apply the distinction to herself.
Hence, as I argued before, the theory lacks the resources to account for the
individuals being sensitive to each other’s conceptions of right and wrong, even as
applicable to themselves. The individual will conceive of herself as “the ultimate judge”
21

So Brandom (2010: 299): “if creatures can take up the different perspective to time slices of

themselves, then the relation among those time-slices is social in my sense. For I am only claiming that
intentionality must be social in the sense that it must admit of the distinction of perspectives between the
attitude of attributing commitment (or other normative status) and the attitude of acknowledging it”.
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and this means that the notions of authority and responsibility would lose their import
on the practice.
Thus, for the practice to be normative it is essential for the participants to have
second-personal interactions; acknowledging the friction of other individual’s assertions
by changing their commitments when they are challenged. This is the ground for the
possibility of them having justifications and reasons that could be publicly inherited and
also individually held. If this kind of interaction was not the essential dynamics of the
practice, what they will be doing would not be characterizable in terms of the notions of
authority and responsibility that according to Brandom articulate the very structure of a
social normative linguistic practice.
The moral of this section is that the commitments of each individual cannot be
made sense of independently of the agreement with others as to whether they are
justified or not. This means that the stances of the individuals in a mutual I-Thou
exchange cannot be thought of as interpretative, scorekeeping stances, where what the
other is committed to is independent of the justification the other individuals have for
what they take her to be committed to. Participants need to reach agreement on the role
of the claims they exchange - whether they see them holding incompatible, entitlement
or commitment relations - in a manner in which they assign largely the same inferential
significance to them. Otherwise, individuals would be left isolated to their own
individual viewpoints and all cognitive friction would be lost.
An essential shift in the way the dynamics of rational exchange is understood
seems to be needed if we are going to make sense of socially articulated practices that
could count as BLP, a theoretical model in which meaning can come to be shared and
the same norms govern the way in which individuals make sense of their own
commitments. To anticipate, what seems to be needed is a way of understanding the
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dynamics of BLP where participants mutually recognize their assessments of the claims
in their exchanges. Along these lines, an alternative characterization of BLP will be
given in the next section.

3. The Dynamics of Second-personal Interaction.

Overcoming the interpretational picture just discussed involves accounting for
the responsiveness of each individual to the assessments of others in a more substantial
way than what is involved in the scorekeeping picture of interaction.
According to the conclusion of the previous section, the notion of interpreter as a
scorekeeper appears to be derivative of a more basic and distinct conception of what one
needs to be doing in order to be involved in a normative linguistic practice. So the
question is then what someone needs to be doing in order to be a participant of a
normative linguistic practice.
In the previous section I argued that challenges of others need to matter for the
individual conception of her own commitments. This implied that the individual needs
to withdraw claims that are challenged. Is it sufficient for someone to do that in order
to count as participant of a socially structured linguistic practice? In this section, I will
argue in favor of a second sort of activity also necessary for someone to be such a
participant. By the end of the section a non-interpretational picture of what
participation in BLP requires in terms of second-personal interaction will be offered.
Assuming a third-personal interpretative stance will prove to be dependent on first
being able to engage in a second-personal interaction with others.22
22

At this point, the readers may be thinking that Davidson’s triangulation might be the right tool to

provide sufficient conditions for participants in BLP, especially his later notion of a second person
(Davidson 1992). Nevertheless, one might doubt this as Davidson never abandons the interpretational
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In MIE’s picture, the minimum conditions sufficient on the part of the
participants in a linguistic practice for them to count as interpreters are that they keep
score of their commitments and entitlements. This means that each participant must
have two boxes: one for his commitments and at least one for other person’s
commitments and entitlements. Granted that if we think of this activity as the basis of
the exchange there are not any meanings in place for them to be dealing with, the key
question to be asked is what makes it possible for someone to keep score on others and
on himself. The conclusion of the previous section is that further characterizations that
account for the sensitivity to correction are needed.
In the framework of MIE, what is necessary and sufficient for an interpreter to
be entitled to attribute a commitment is just that the interpreted one does something that
makes it appropriate for the interpreter to attribute the commitment. This is what counts
as undertaking a commitment, which is different from acknowledging a commitment.
The latter notion implies not only undertaking the commitment but accepting the
commitment that one had undertaken by overtly doing something that in the eyes of the
scorekeeper counts as committing herself in that way. Is the notion of acknowledgment
just described sufficient to account for the subject to be engaged in second-personal sort
of interaction with another person of the kind described in the previous section where
each other’s assessments necessarily matter for the individual’s point of view?
Brandom presents an example that can be taken as paradigmatic of how he
understands acknowledging a commitment.
The example is inspired by an Eighteenth-Century British practice. According
to this practice, taking “the Queen’s shilling” from a recruiting officer counted as
committing the recipient to military service. This practice actually functioned by

stance characteristic of radical interpretation even when he refers to it as “second person”. See also n. 17
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making people in taverns take the Queen’s shilling from these officers without them
realizing the commitment they were by that act undertaking. As Brandom analyses the
case, the mere taking the shilling counts as an acknowledgment of the commitment
undertaken. The conclusion is that the significance of the acknowledgment of
commitment must be understood in terms of the practical attitudes of the participants in
the eyes of those attributing it and not by some special act of recognition of the
commitment attributed on the part attributee.
But, is making it appropriate for others to attribute a commitment sufficient to
count as a participant of the practice (undertake commitments, as we may say)? The
obvious answer is no. The reason why this is not sufficient is that one has to be
attributing commitments also. Here lies the crucial difference between other animals,
for example, and humans. And more in general between communities to which
commitments can be attributed (that is: the doings of their members can count for others
as undertakings of commitments) and communities whose members can attribute
commitments. This shows that the Queen’s shilling example cannot be generalized.23
There must be something else in place in order to make sense of which doings are
necessary in order to be a language user other than it just being appropriate for us to
attribute a commitment to them, in the absence of any recognition of an attribution.
Moreover, there is an important closely related issue pointed out by Pippin (2006),

above.
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As a reviewer remarked, the specific recruitment practice of the Queen’s shilling depends on a wider

up-and-running practice- the drunkard’s commitment is dependent on him previously being a loyal
servant to the Queen- and thus depends on the dynamics of acknowledgment and attribution of
commitments that make such practice possible. This may speak against the possibility of generalizing the
shilling case to characterize acknowledgement. But the notion of acknowledgment Brandom deploys to
understand the background practice is the same: making for others appropriate to attribute a commitment,
and hence the problem lies at the heart of Brandom’s account. For an analysis of the shilling example
along the same lines, see Pippin (2006): 395-6.
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namely, that because of the way Brandom characterizes acknowledgement- as making it
appropriate by doing something to be attributed a commitment- he cannot make sense
of the idea of commitments being freely undertaken by the subjects, having the
character of self-imposed norms, something that Brandom himself wants to account for,
especially when emphasizing his Kantian lineage (See MIE: ch.1, and TMD: 219)
What is exactly the difference in the most basic case between participants of
linguistic practices and beings to which commitments are only attributed? The
difference, I want to suggest, is that the interpreter has to recognize commitments, that
is, it is not only necessary to undertake commitments but also to acknowledge some of
them oneself in a different sense than just making it appropriate for others to attribute
them to us. That is what we have been calling recognition of commitments.24 Promises
and marriages are typical examples of this kind of recognition. In such acts it is
essential for their felicity that those involved know and acknowledge their commitment
to fulfilling the promises thereby undertaken. If e.g. the promisee were only interpreting
that a promise is being made to her, then no commitment would hold for the other part
no matter how misleading were her acts.
We can agree with Brandom that the notion of acknowledgement is a normative
one. By acknowledging something -p - we respond to that as something that is
appropriate for us to be attributed commitment to. It is thus a notion that needs to be
modeled taking into account the ways in which our action is assessed as correct or
incorrect. But, as it was argued before, if we take into account only the individual’s
doings - seen in the eyes of others but insolated from to any influence of those
assessments in how the individual keeps her score on herself- we cannot make sense of
24

As it will be apparent, there is a strong tie between recognition and freedom. Only free subjects can be

part of such a recognitional practice, since each participant must be in a position to endorse the attribution
(or reject it). I will come back to this at the end of this section.
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the individuals becoming sensitive to normativity. The notion of being correct collapses
in this view since it is unintelligible that a proper criterion of correction is in place. In
the basic case this counts as lacking the criteria for sameness of commitment as a
normative notion to be applied to herself and others. If , in a social model of
normativity, acknowledgement is a notion that needs to be modeled taking into account
the ways in which our action is assessed as correct or incorrect and these have to impact
the conception the individual has of what she is doing, acknowledging a commitment
should not be thought of as “ making appropriate for others to attribute a commitment”.
Rather it is to be understood as a way of (correctly or incorrectly) recognizing an
assessment of correction by others (i.e. recognizing a commitment that is attributed to
us). It appears, thus, as the way in which we are sensitive to those assessments25.
It is in the framework of making sense of this sensitivity where the interaction of
a second-personal sort (as opposed to a third-personal one) comes into view. Becoming
an interpreter has to be done in the first instance by acknowledging, in the sense of
recognizing, the assessments of someone else (in the basic case it can be the recognition
of another person’s reactions towards our doings).
The order of explanation cannot account for a third personal way of assessing
others commitments without making sense of this notion in a manner that necessarily
matters for the individual- i.e. as part of a second personal sort of exchange. The
individual has to recognize the assessments of others in the first place and only thereby
25

As will be shown, at least in some cases acknowledgment is of commitments attributed (by someone

else), i.e. recognizing them by changing your score. This is particularly important to be a participant of
the practice, although it is not a general constraint on acknowledgments nor on the things we are
committed to. We can be committed to things we do not know we are (ignorance) or be mistaken about
our commitments (error). Moreover, the content of the claim acknowledged might, and usually will,
outrun our grasping of it. The point is rather that the individuals need to recognize the appropriateness of
the attribution – and all what follows from it.
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would it be possible for her to take the stance of an external interpreter. This
recognizing of the assessment is in the first instance the recognition of the commitment
attributed to her by someone else; it is the act of recognition by which the attributee
includes the commitment attributed in her own box. This is one of the sides of what
counts as having a second-personal sort of interaction with someone else. Nevertheless,
this cannot be the whole story since it could still be the case that one participant could
not recognize the criticisms that other participants may address to her (the very trait that
in the previous section showed itself as necessary to be in place in any linguistic
practice). Lacking this trait, she would not be in the position to take herself to be wrong,
and hence she would not be sensitive to assessments of correction, and to normativity at
all.
So, in order to make sense of the notion of a participant of a normative linguistic
practice there are two attitudes that must be in place.
The first one is for the individual to recognize the commitment attributed to her
by others. We can think of this recognition as one side of the constitution of the
authority that a practitioner must inherit from the reactions of another person regarding
her individual doings. But, second, the sensitivity to correction must at the same time
account for the possibility of being wrong, for the possibility to be corrected by others.
The special way in which this recognition is effective is again by recognizing the other
person’s claim, but this time as a challenge. This is the other side of the coin and
different in character from the recognizing-acknowledging of an attributed commitment
just described.
So, if, on the one hand, the recognition by acknowledging commitments is
needed in order to make sense of one’s taking oneself to be committed, on the other
hand, what is needed in order to make sense of one’s being entitled to that commitment,
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i.e. of the possibility of being wrong, is the recognition of another person’s challenges
by acknowledging her criticisms as determining what one is not entitled to when one is
committed to something. This is what has been argued for as necessary in the previous
section.
In sum, a second-personal sort of interaction involves the presence of two
dimensions of social exchange: on the one hand, there must be an acknowledging of the
other person’s attributions of commitments in the loaded sense of recognizing such
attribution and not merely doing so in ‘the eyes of the interpreter’ (one side of the
recognition of the authority of the attributor); on the other, the sensitivity to correction
implies one recognizing the incompatibilities attributed - the challenges made by others,
i.e. the recognition of other person’s criticism by changing one’s own box, by
withdrawing commitments previously held (this is the side of authority that is strictly
linked with responsibility). If this second activity were not in place, we would lose the
possibility of correcting each other and hence the possibility of self-correcting
ourselves.
This second-personal interaction can be thought of as describing the proper
dynamics of the mutual recognition of authority and responsibility. It is the activity that
takes place when two interlocutors acknowledge each other’s claims by changing their
commitments, either by undertaking a commitment attributed or by withdrawing a
commitment previously held. And this activity is the one needed to make sense of a
normative linguistic practice in the first place.
This speaks against Brandom’s claim that there is no significant difference
between the point of view from within the practice and an external stance towards it.
The second-personal dynamics I have described can only make sense within a practice
and is not reducible to an external stance on it. It properly exhibits the form of a
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conversation, where each person’s contribution matters for the individuals involved, and
not of interpretation, where individuals can remain ignorant about each other’s
assessments.
To think of the BLP as a form of conversation not equivalent to two interpreters
keeping score of each other “from the outside” (i.e. the collapse of the internal and
external perspectives) brings to the fore another important structural difference between
the second personal understanding of the fine structure of rationality and an
interpretational understanding of it.
As said before one key aspect of the notion of recognition as opposed to the idea
of “making appropriate to others to attribute commitments”, is that recognition speaks
to freedom, Pippin’s worry mentioned above. It speaks to it because to recognize a
commitment is to endorse it. Something that an individual might freely decide not to do.
Importantly if the individual rejects the attribution then the stage of shared norms is not
reached. There is conflict, not a shared norm in place. For there to a be a shared norm
there has to be agreement: both individuals, the attributer and the attributee, need to
endorse the commitment and share its interpretation. This is to think of content in terms
of one box and not two. The content of p is to be assessed in the light of all the
individual doings in a coherent manner. This is compatible with there being material
disagreements in practice as to what the meaning of a claim is but those are to be seen
as in need of being resolved. Because these are to be thought as belonging to just one
shared semantic interpretation there is cognitive friction that is in need of being resolved
by reaching agreement. Agreement is then a normative matter, a regulative principle of
the practice, that gives unity to the structure of semantic contents. This is in striking
contrast with the idea that interpretations and incompatibilities lie at the heart of BLP,
for a principle of agreement in conversation outruns individual interpretations
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exercising normative pressure towards common understanding and against potential
conflict and incompatibilities.

4. Concluding remarks

The aim of this paper was to show that Brandom’s account of normative
linguistic practices is problematic and needs to be reshaped in terms of a secondpersonal sort of interaction. If these arguments are sound, then it is simply not true that
the fundamental form of our engagement with others is interpretational. Rather, second
personal interaction implies a form of sharing reasons that is first-personally accessible
for each of those involved in a way that is irreducibly inaccessible to an interpretational
external stance from where we are only observable or interpretable as doing something
but not experiencing it together. Brandom talks about the fundamental collapse between
the internal perspective and the external one. Such a collapse is an illusion. The internal,
second-personal point of view shapes our sense of authority and responsibility as
rational beings in a way that cannot be made intelligible from a merely external
perspective. The external, observational stance is of a fundamental distinct type as
compared to an internal, participant or second-person perspective. The later implies that
a fundamental agreement is built upon the actual exchanges and mutual responsiveness
of the practitioners. We can observe communities and attribute entitlements and
commitments to them; perhaps we can do this with other animals or computers, but
what is at stake in the case of the internal, participatory interaction, is the acquiring and
occupying of a place in a shared space that is shaped by our responsiveness to each
other.
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